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Abstract—This paper studies operation decisions of energy
storage facilities in perfectly and imperfectly competitive mar-
kets. In a perfectly competitive market, the storage facility is op-
erated to maximize the social welfare. However, in a imperfectly
competitive market, the storage facility operates to maximize
its profit, while the market operator aims at maximizing the
social welfare. In this case, the storage facility adapts its strategic
behavior to take advantage of market conditions. To model the
imperfectly competitive market, a bi-level optimization model
is implemented to present the interactions between the storage
facility and the market operator. In an illustrative test system,
operation of the storage facility in these two market structures
is compared and discussed.
Index Terms—Bidding strategy, Energy storage, Market op-
erator, Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPEC)
A. Indices and Sets
t Index of time periods running from 1 to Nt.
g Index of generation units running from 1 to Ng .
s Index of energy storage systems running from
1 to Ns.
d Index of load demands running from 1 to Nd.
B. Parameters
MCdiss Marginal cost of energy storage system s in the
discharging mode, ($/MWh).
MCchs Marginal cost of energy storage system s in the
charging mode, ($/MWh).
MCg Marginal cost of generation unit g, ($/MWh).
P dis,maxs Maximum limit on generated power of en-
ergy storage system s in the discharging mode,
(MW).
P ch,maxs Maximum limit on stored power of energy
storage system s in the charging mode, (MW).
Emaxs Maximum limit on stored energy of energy
storage system s, (MWh).
Einis Initial value of stored energy of energy storage
system s, (MWh).
αs A non-negative factor to control stored energy
of energy storage system s for the the next time
horizon.
ηs Efficiency of energy storage system s.
Pmaxg Capacity of generation unit g, (MW).
P inig Initial value of generated power of generation
unit g, (MW).
Pmaxd,t Maximum load demand of consumer d at time
t, (MW).
Ud,t Bid price of load demand d at time t, ($/MWh).
C. Variables
udiss,t Binary decision variable to indicate if energy
storage system s is in the discharging mode at
time t.
uchs,t Binary decision variable to indicate if energy
storage system s is in the charging mode at time
t.
uidls,t Binary decision variable to indicate if energy
storage system s is in the idle mode at time t.
P
dis
s,t Quantity offer by energy storage system s in the
discharging mode at time t, (MW).
P
ch
s,t Quantity bid by energy storage system s in the
charging mode at time t, (MW).
pg,t Power generated by generation unit g at time t,
(MW).
pdiss,t Power generated by energy storage system s in
the discharging mode at time t, (MW).
pchs,t Power stored by energy storage system s in the
charging mode at time t, (MW).
odiss,t Price offer by energy storage system s in the
discharging mode at time t, ($/MWh).
ochs,t Price bid by energy storage system s in the
charging mode at time t, ($/MWh).
es,t Energy stored in energy storage system s at time
t, (MWh).
pd,t Power consumed by load demand d at time t,
(MW).
µ, λ Dual variables corresponding to the lower level
constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale electric energy storage is being considered as
one of the potential enablers for a more flexible grid, and thus
is expected to grow significantly over the coming years [1].
As an example, California has set a goal of feeding 33% of its
energy through renewable resources [2], 80% of which to be
coming from wind and solar generation [3]. To accommodate
this much intermittent energy, the California Public Utilities
Commission has mandated the three big utilities to have 1325
MW of energy storage in operation by 2024 [4]. Besides,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allows
energy storage, as one of so-called “non-generation” resources,
to participate in electricity markets [5]. Therefore, exploring
optimal operational strategies for large-scale energy storage
resources is of particular interest.
Over the past few years, a number of works have been
reported which are focused on operation of energy storage.
In particular, the existing literature on the optimal operation
of energy storage systems can be divided into two broad
categories depending on who operates the facility. In the first
category, energy storage facilities are operated in a centrally
controlled market. In such context, energy storage may serve
a number of purposes, such as, improving system reliability
or facilitating high renewable energy penetration. In [6] and
[7], a compressed air energy storage and a pumped-storage
hydro, as the two largest worldwide installed storage facility
technologies, are employed to reduce the total generation cost
for a system with high wind penetration. In [8], impacts of
energy storage in terms of power system reliability on a system
with integrated renewable energy resources are discussed. In
[9], plug-in vehicles as mobile storage devices are used to
maximize the utilization of renewable energy resources in
terms of cost and emission. In [10], the optimal capacity and
operation for a storage facility is optimized to minimize the
total system operation cost and also its impact on price is
explored. In this category of studies, energy storage is not
considered as an independent for-profit entity, and thus, its
profitability is not addressed.
In the second category, energy storage is operated as a
merchant and for-profit entity. These studies can further be
divided into two groups depending on how the storage facility
would impact market prices. In the first group, the storage
facilities are treated as price-takers, i.e., they are assumed to
be small enough such that their actions do not affect market
prices. In such context, operation of the storage facilities is
optimized under the assumption that the future market prices
are known in advance. Hence, the storage operator would use
historical price data, and optimizes its operation decisions
accordingly. In [11], an energy storage facility is owned by
a wind farm and its operation decisions are made according
to the wind farm’s power production estimates in order to
maximize the owner’s profit. In [12], a few distributed storage
systems are operated by an aggregator to meet the local load
demand at the minimum cost. In [13], a storage facility is
operated by an independent utility to maximize its profit in
both energy and reserve markets. In the second group, the
energy storage facilities are considered as price-makers [14],
i.e., they are large and their actions actually impact market
prices. In this group of studies, the facilities, which have the
price-maker capability and their objective is to maximize their
profit, can bid not necessary at their marginal cost. This may
lead to an imperfectly competitive market environment.
To investigate the optimal bidding strategies of market play-
ers in an imperfect competitive market environment, several
studies have reported the application of Mathematical Program
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) models [14], [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19]. The MPEC approach for electricity market
modeling was initially used in the pioneering work [15].
Other studies followed by using the MPEC approach in other
electricity market studies, such as, on strategic behavior of a
producer in [16], the optimal investment of a strategic producer
in [17], the strategic offering of a wind power producer in
[18], the strategic bidding of a large consumer in [19], and
the strategic bidding of a storage facility [14].
In addition, several relevant papers exist in the technical
literature addressing the perfect and imperfect competitions in
power systems, e.g., [20] referring to the offering strategy of
producers, and [21] referring to the transmission expansion
planning. In these two papers, a Cournot model is used to
model the imperfect competition. Their findings show that
each market player with market power capability can poten-
tially adapt its strategy considering the market conditions to
alter the market-clearing outcomes to its own benefit. In this
paper, we compare the storage facility’s operation in perfectly
and imperfectly competitive markets. The operation of storage
facility for each hour in both cases is discussed with details.
The main contribution of this paper is to compare the
storage facility’s operation in two market circumstances. This
study provides a good understanding of market structures’
impacts on storage facilities’ operation decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The methodol-
ogy and formulation are provided in Section II. The results are
presented and discussed in Section III. The paper is concluded
in Section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY AND FORMULATION
In this section, the proposed method for determining the
optimal bidding strategy of a storage facility in perfectly and
imperfectly competitive market structures are presented.
A. Storage Facilities’ Operation in a Perfectly Competitive
Market
In a perfectly competitive market, all market players offer at
their marginal costs. The market operator accepts the bids and
offers to maximize the social welfare and satisfy the physical
market constraints. This problem is formulated in (a.1)-(a.6)
as given below:
Min.
Nt∑
t=1
[ Ng∑
g=1
MCg.pg,t +
Ns∑
s=1
MCdiss,t .p
dis
s,t
−
Ns∑
s=1
MCchs,t.p
ch
s,t −
Nd∑
d=1
Ud,t.pd,t
]
(a.1)
S.t.
Nd∑
d=1
pd,t −
Ns∑
s=1
[pdiss,t − pchs,t]−
Ng∑
g=1
pg,t = 0 : λt; ∀t (a.2)
0 ≤ pg,t ≤ Pmaxg ∀g,∀t (a.3)
0 ≤ pd,t ≤ Pmaxd,t ∀d, ∀t (a.4)
0 ≤ pdiss,t ≤ P dis,maxs ∀s,∀t (a.5)
0 ≤ pchs,t ≤ P ch,maxs ∀s,∀t (a.6)
The objective function of this problem seeks to minimize
the negative of social welfare, which is the difference between
generation cost and demand utility, as presented in (a.1). (a.2)
enforces the energy balance, whose dual variable provides
the system marginal cost (SMC). (a.3) binds generators’
production levels. (a.4) binds the consumption level of load
demands. (a.5) and (a.6) enforce the energy storage facilities to
discharge/charge between zero and their maximum capacities,
respectively.
B. Storage Facilities’ Operation in an Imperfectly Competitive
Market Environment
In this section, the storage facility’s operation in an im-
perfectly competitive market environment is formulated using
a bi-level model. This model has two components, i.e., an
upper level problem modeling the operation of the storage
facility and the lower problem, i.e., modeling the market-
clearing process. The upper and lower level problems are first
discussed, and then, the bi-level model is transformed into a
single-level MPEC and solved accordingly.
The upper level problem seeks to maximize the storage
facility’s profit, as formulated in (b.1)-(b.10):
Min.
Nt∑
t=1
Ns∑
s=1
[
(λt +MC
ch
s ).p
ch
s,t
− (λt −MCdiss ).pdiss,t
]
(b.1)
S.t.
udiss,t + u
ch
s,t + u
idl
s,t = 1 ∀s,∀t (b.2)
0 ≤ pdiss,t ≤ udiss,t .P dis,maxs ∀s,∀t (b.3)
0 ≤ pchs,t ≤ uchs,t.P ch,maxs ∀s,∀t (b.4)
odiss,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (b.5)
ochs,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (b.6)
0 ≤ es,t ≤ Emaxs ∀s,∀t (b.7)
es,t = E
ini
s − pdiss,t + ηs.pchs,t ∀s, t = 1 (b.8)
es,t = es,(t−1) − pdiss,t + ηs.pchs,t ∀s,∀t > 1 (b.9)
es,t = αs.E
ini
s ∀s, t = Nt (b.10)
The objective function (b.1) is composed of two terms. The
first term is associated with the cost incurred for purchasing
and storing energy in the charging mode. It is composed of the
cost of buying energy from market and the costs of that might
be associated to storing this energy by the energy storage
charging device (e.g., the costs of compression in the case of
compressed air energy storage). The second term is associated
with the energy storage profit in discharging mode, which
is calculated through the revenue achieved by selling energy
to the market minus the costs that might be associated with
releasing the stored energy (e.g., the expanding costs in the
case of compressed air energy storage). Note that SMC (λi)
is endogenously obtained from the lower level problem.
Three operation modes for the energy storage facility are
considered in (b.2), which are discharging, charging, and
idling, i.e., when the facility is operating in neither discharging
nor charging modes. (b.3) and (b.4) bind the energy storage
quantity offers and bids, respectively. (b.5) and (b.6) enforce
the non-negativity of the energy storage offer and bid prices,
respectively. (b.7) refers to upper and lower bounds for the
storage facility energy reservoir. (b.8) and (b.9) represent
the energy storage state of charge for the first and rest of
hours, respectively. (b.10) is designed to specify the state of
charge at the end of planning horizon. For sake of simplicity,
transmission system constraints are not modeled.
In the lower level problem, the market operator clears the
market based on submitted bids and offers. The storage facility
strategically offers/bids in both quantity and price. We assume
that other market participants submit their offer and bid prices
based on their marginal cost/utility. This assumption enables
us to model the problem of this paper as an MPEC problem,
in line with [15]. The lower level problem is formulated in
by (c.1)-(c.6), which are similar to (a.1)-(a.6). However, (a.5)
and (a.6) are substituted by (c.5) and (c.6) which restrict the
discharging and charging power of energy storage facilities by
their submitted quantity offers and bids.
Min.
Nt∑
t=1
[ Ng∑
g=1
MCg.pg,t +
Ns∑
s=1
odiss,t .p
dis
s,t
−
Ns∑
s=1
ochs,t.p
ch
s,t −
Nd∑
d=1
Ud,t.pd,t
]
(c.1)
S.t.
Nd∑
d=1
pd,t −
Ns∑
s=1
[pdiss,t − pchs,t]−
Ng∑
g=1
pg,t = 0 : λt; ∀t (c.2)
0 ≤ pg,t ≤ Pmaxg : µming,t , µmaxg,t ; ∀g,∀t (c.3)
0 ≤ pd,t ≤ Pmaxd,t : µmind,t , µmaxd,t ; ∀d, ∀t (c.4)
0 ≤ pdiss,t ≤ pdiss,t : µdis,mins,t , µdis,maxs,t ; ∀s,∀t (c.5)
0 ≤ pchs,t ≤ pchs,t : µch,mins,t , µch,maxs,t ; ∀s,∀t (c.6)
The dual variables pertaining to constraints above are spec-
ified at each equation. Note that the binary decisions, as well
as the offering and bidding decisions of the energy storage
(price and quantity) are upper level variables. However, they
are fixed values within the lower level problem. Therefore,
the lower level problem is continuous, linear, and thus convex
[19].
In order to transfer the bi-level model into a single-level
MPEC, the primal-dual transformation is applied [22]. (d.1)-
(d.7) provided in the Appendix give the dual constraints of
the lower level problem. Equation (d.8) refers to the strong
duality condition corresponding to the lower level problem,
which enforces the equality of its primal and dual objective
function values at the optimal solution.
TABLE I
GENERATION UNITS CHARACTERISTICS
Unit No. Bus No. P
max
g MCg RU
max
g RD
max
g P
ini
g
(MW) ($/MWh) (MW/h) (MW/h) (MW)
G1 1 100 12 20 20 100
G2 2 75 20 12 12 75
G3 6 50 50 10 10 0
G4 6 50 300 10 10 0
TABLE II
STORAGE FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS
Storage Bus No. P
dis,max
s P
ch,max
s MC
dis
s MC
ch
s
facility (MW) (MW) ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
1 5 20 15 18 1
The single-level MPEC problem includes upper level prob-
lem (b.1)-(b.10), primal constraints (c.2)-(c.6), dual constraints
(d.1)-(d.7) and strong duality condition (d.8). There are some
non-linear terms in the MPEC formulation due to the product
of prices and quantities in (d.8) and (b.1). Note that since there
are also binary variables within MPEC, it is in fact a mixed-
integer non-linear programming problem, while there is no
off-the-shelf solver available to solve this kind of problems.
Thus, pursuing linearity, the strong duality condition as well
as the primal inequality constraints and the non-negativity
conditions can be replaced by the set of complementary
conditions obtained by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
of the lower level problem (e.1)-(e.8) [22], [23].
Each of complementarity conditions can be linearized by
its mixed-integer linear equivalent as explained in [24]. Also,
the linear equivalent of objective function (b.1) can be driven
from dual conditions, the strong duality condition, and the
complementarity conditions [16]. The linear objective function
is stated in Appendix as (f.1).
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, a six-bus system [25] is studied to demon-
strate the storage operation in two market structures.
Technical characteristics of the generation units are given
in Tables I. The storage facility technical characteristics are
provided in Table II. The energy storage’s charging and dis-
charging components are modeled separately. This is mainly
inspired by the operation of a compressed air energy storage
facility [26]. This separation provides further flexibility in
modeling and analysis of different storage technologies. The
capacity of storage facility’s energy reservoir is assumed to
be 100 MWh. In this test system, a period of 24 hours is
considered as the planning horizon. The planning horizon for
the bidding strategy of energy storage is selected to reasonably
match the storage reservoir size [27], larger reservoirs may
require a longer planning period. It is assumed that the facility
starts empty and comes back to the same state at the end
of the planning horizon. Also, without losing generality, the
efficiency of both charge and discharge devices are supposed
to be 100%. The hourly load distribution over the 24 hours
horizon is shown in Fig. 1. The load is distributed equally
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
140
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240
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Figure 1. Demand over 24 hours, (
∑
d
Pmaxd,t ,∀t)
among buses 3 and 4. All loads bid at $450/MWh for all
hours.
The following test cases are studied:
• Case 1: The energy storage, which is operated by the
market operator, participates in the perfectly competitive
market.
• Case 2: The energy storage, which is controlled by
an independent operator, bids and offers strategically to
maximize its profit in the imperfectly competitive market.
Case 1: In this case, we assume the storage facility par-
ticipates in the market as a non-strategic player, and thus,
the market is perfectly competitive. The detailed numerical
results for this case are presented in Table III. We have also
presented the consumption values at each hour in this table.
The purpose of this case is to demonstrate a simple case where
the numerical results could be tracked. Also, we will compare
the results of other cases to this base case.
In the first hour, the load is 176 MW and is supplied by
generation units G1, G2, and G3. Since generation units G1
and G2 are dispatched at their full capacity in this hour, the
marginal cost of generation unit G3 sets the SMC, which
is $50/MWh. In the second hour, the load is 165 MW and
the storage facility is charged at a 10 MW rate. The SMC
is cleared at $31/MWh, which is less than the marginal cost
of the generation unit who can supply the next MW demand,
i.e., unit G3. To justify this value, observe that in this hour,
the next MW could be supplied by unit G2 if the storage
facility was being charged one less MW. The value of this
MW is equal to the would be selling price when discharging,
i.e., $50/MWh at either of hours except for hours that the
storage is fully dispatched (e.g., hour 18), minus the storage
facility’s operation costs in charging and discharging modes,
i.e., 18+1=19 $/MWh. Thus, the SMC of the second hour
is calculated 50-19=31 $/MWh. Hours 3-6 are considered as
low demand periods and thus, the storage facility is charged
at the maximum rate, i.e., 15 MW. In these hours, the SMC
is determined by the marginal cost of generation unit G2,
i.e., $20/MWh. Similar to hour 2, the SMC at hour 7 is
$31/MWh. For hours 8-17, the SMC is $50/MWh, which is
equal to the marginal cost of generation unit G3. At hour 18,
the load demand is 246 MW and the SMC is determined by
the marginal cost of the most expensive unit, i.e., G4. Note
TABLE III
SCHEDULE RESULTS IN CASE 1: THE ENERGY STORAGE IS A
NON-STRATEGIC PLAYER
Hour pd,t p
dis
s,t /p
ch
s,t
pg,t λi,tG1 G2 G3 G4
(MW) (MW)∗ (MW) ($/MWh)
1 176 100 75 1 0 50
2 165 -10 100 75 0 0 31
3 158 -15 100 73 0 0 20
4 154 -15 100 69 0 0 20
5 155 -15 100 70 0 0 20
6 159 -15 100 74 0 0 20
7 173 -2 100 75 0 0 31
8 177 100 75 2 0 50
9 177 100 75 2 0 50
10 181 100 75 6 0 50
11 188 100 75 13 0 50
12 190 100 75 15 0 50
13 195 100 75 20 0 50
14 196 100 75 21 0 50
15 197 100 75 22 0 50
16 218 100 75 43 0 50
17 221 12 100 75 34 0 50
18 252 20 100 75 50 7 300
19 244 20 100 75 49 0 50
20 237 20 100 75 42 0 50
21 219 100 75 44 0 50
22 209 100 75 34 0 50
23 205 100 75 30 0 50
24 184 100 75 9 0 50
* A negative/positive value corresponds to the storage facility
charging/discharging mode.
TABLE IV
STORAGE FACILITY AND GENERATION UNITS PROFIT ($1000)
Case No. Storage G1 G2 G3 G4 All Gen.units
Case 1 5.660 100.4 60.9 12.5 0 173.8
Case 2 13.542 148.2 96.75 37.5 0 282.45
that for hours 19 and 20, operation of the storage facility
has led to a lower SMC of $50/MWh. This is because if
the storage facility were not operating, the demand would
have been met by generation unit G4, and the SMC would
have been $300/MWh at these two hours. However, since the
storage facility discharges energy back to the system during
these hours, the SMC remains at the marginal cost of unit G3,
i.e., $50/MWh. Thus, operation of the storage has reduced the
market price for theses hours. For the remaining hours, i.e.,
21-24, unit G3 sets the price at $50/MWh. The total profit in
this case is $5660 for the storage facility, and $173800 for
the rest of the fleet. The profits of the storage facility and
other generation units for this case, and all other cases, are
summarized in Table IV.
Case 2: The market outcomes for this case are presented in
Table V. The results obtained for hour 1 are identical to those
of Base Case. For hour 2, the storage facility strategically
bids to buy 10 MW at $20/MWh, which is identical to the
marginal cost of generation unit G2. The storage facility bids
such that there is no need to dispatch generation unit G3. Thus,
the demand is supplied by generation units G1 and G2. The
SMC for this hour is identical to the marginal cost of the last
generation unit dispatched and the bid price of the last demand
supplied (i.e., storage), that is $20/MWh. For hours 3-7, the
storage facility price bid is the same as hour 2. The storage
TABLE V
SCHEDULE RESULTS IN CASE 2: THE STORAGE FACILITY PLAYS
STRATEGICALLY
Hour pd,t
Storage facility pg,t λi,tpdiss,t /p
ch
s,t o
dis
s,t /o
ch
s,t G1 G2 G3 G4
(MW) (MW) ($/MWh) (MW) ($/MWh)
1 176 100 75 1 0 50
2 165 -10 20 100 75 0 0 20
3 158 -15 20 100 73 0 0 20
4 154 -15 20 100 69 0 0 20
5 155 -15 20 100 70 0 0 20
6 159 -15 20 100 74 0 0 20
7 173 -2 20 100 75 0 0 20
8 177 100 75 2 0 50
9 177 100 75 2 0 50
10 181 100 75 6 0 50
11 188 100 75 13 0 50
12 190 100 75 15 0 50
13 195 100 75 20 0 50
14 196 100 75 21 0 50
15 197 20 50 100 75 2 0 50
16 218 100 75 43 0 50
17 221 100 75 46 0 50
18 252 20 300 100 75 50 7 300
19 244 19 300 100 75 50 0 300
20 237 12 300 100 75 50 0 300
21 219 100 75 44 0 50
22 209 100 75 34 0 50
23 205 1 50 100 75 29 0 50
24 184 100 75 9 0 50
facility stays in the idle mode during hours 8-14 and 16-17,
and discharges at its maximum level at hour 15. For hour 18,
it strategically offers its maximum discharge level at a price
identical to the marginal cost of unit G4. This way, the SMC
is determined by the marginal cost of unit G4, $300/MWh.
For hour 19, the storage facility offers strategically 19 MW
at $300/MWh. Through this strategy, generation unit G3 is
dispatched to its maximum level and the next MW should be
supplied by unit G4. Therefore, the SMC stays at $300/MWh.
Similarly, for hour 20, the storage facility offers 12 MW
at $300/MWh. The storage facility offers its remaining one
MWh during hour 23 at price of $50/MWh to meet the initial
charging condition for next day.
The hourly SMCs for Cases 1 and 2 are illustrated in Fig.
2. The figure shows how the strategic behavior of the storage
facility impacts the hourly SMCs, i.e., lower SMCs when it
charges and higher SMCs when it discharges. Note that if the
storage facility plays based on its marginal cost, the storage
facility compared to a case in which there is no storage facility
in the system, increases and decreases the market price in
charging and discharging modes, respectively. The reason lies
in supply and demand balance constraints. In an imperfect
competition, as explained in Case 2, the facility through this
strategic bidding avoids such impacts on market price. From
this figure and also the results reflected in Table IV, the impact
on prices in Case 2 benefits not only the storage facility, but
also other generators. Overall, and among all the units, the
peaking ones experience the highest increase in their profit as
they only generate during the higher price hours.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper compares and studies the bidding strategy of a
price-maker storage facility in both perfectly and imperfectly
competitive markets. The storage operation in both market
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Figure 2. Comparing the hourly SMCs between Cases 1 and 2
structures is formulated. To model an imperfectly competition
market, a bi-level model is implemented to present the inter-
actions between the storage facility and the market operator.
The primal-dual and KKT conditions are applied to transform
the bi-level problem into an MPEC, that can be recast as a
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). In both perfect
and imperfect competitions, impacts of storage facility’s op-
eration decisions on hourly SMCs and generation schedule
are presented and discussed. In an imperfect competition, the
merchant storage facility was found to adjust its operation
strategies to take advantage of existing circumstances in the
market to increase its profit.
APPENDIX
The dual of the lower level problem is stated as follows:
odiss,t − λt + µdis,maxs,t − µdis,mins,t = 0 ∀s,∀t (d.1)
− ochs,t + λt + µch,maxs,t − µch,mins,t = 0 ∀s,∀t (d.2)
MCg − λt + µmaxg,t − µming,t = 0 ∀g,∀t (d.3)
− Ud,t + λt + µmaxd,t − µmind,t = 0 ∀d,∀t (d.4)
µmaxg,t , µ
min
g,t ≥ 0 ∀g,∀t (d.5)
µmaxd,t , µ
min
d,t ≥ 0 ∀d,∀t (d.6)
µdis,maxs,t , µ
dis,min
s,t , µ
ch,max
s,t , µ
ch,min
s,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (d.7)
Nt∑
t=1
[ Ng∑
g=1
MCg.pg,t +
Ns∑
s=1
odiss,t .p
dis
s,t
−
Ns∑
s=1
ochs,t.p
ch
s,t −
Nd∑
d=1
Ud,t.pd,t
]
=
−
Nt∑
t=1
Ns∑
s=1
[
µdis,maxs,t .p
dis
s,t + µ
ch,max
s,t .p
ch
s,t
]
−
Nt∑
t=1
Ng∑
g=1
µmaxg,t .P
max
g −
Nt∑
t=1
Nd∑
d=1
[
µmaxd,t .P
max
d,t
]
(d.8)
The KKT conditions of the lower level are stated as follows:
0 ≤ pg,t ⊥ µming,t ≥ 0 ∀g,∀t (e.1)
0 ≤ (Pmaxg − pg,t) ⊥ µmaxg,t ≥ 0 ∀g,∀t (e.2)
0 ≤ pd,t ⊥ µmind,t ≥ 0 ∀d,∀t (e.3)
0 ≤ (Pmaxd,t − pd,t) ⊥ µmaxd,t ≥ 0 ∀d,∀t (e.4)
0 ≤ pdiss,t ⊥ µdis,mins,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (e.5)
0 ≤ (pdiss,t − pdiss,t ) ⊥ µdis,maxs,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (e.6)
0 ≤ pchs,t ⊥ µch,mins,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (e.7)
0 ≤ (pchs,t − pchs,t) ⊥ µch,maxs,t ≥ 0 ∀s,∀t (e.8)
The linearized objective function is stated as follows:
Min.
Nt∑
t=1
Ns∑
s=1
[
MCdiss .p
dis
s,t +MC
ch
s .p
ch
s,t]
+
Nt∑
t=1
Ng∑
g=1
MCg.pg,t −
Nt∑
t=1
Nd∑
d=1
Ud,t.pd,t
+
Nt∑
t=1
Ng∑
g=1
[
µmaxg,t .P
max
g +
Nt∑
t=1
Nd∑
d=1
[
µmaxd,t .P
max
d,t
]
(f.1)
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